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COMMENTS

God in a Cage: Religion, Intent,
and Criminal Law
INTRODUCTION

The autopsy performed on Kenneth Goins revealed the cause of
death to be a stab wound penetrating his heart.' The blade had passed
four and three-quarters inches into his chest.2 Two other knives and a
hatchet had also been embedded in his body.3
Robert Strong, also known as Omar Ali Shereiff, a fifty-seven year
old native of Arabia who had emigrated at the age of nineteen first to
China and then three years later to the United States,4 was charged with
the crime. Strong was not convicted of murder. He was convicted of
manslaughter in the second degree and argued on appeal "that the trial
court erred in refusing to grant his request that the jury be charged that
they could find him guilty of criminally negligent homicide.., as a lesser
included crime." 5
A remarkable situation: the defendant admittedly responsible for a
brutal slaying using three knives and a hatchet,6 and he expects the court
to grant his request for jury instructions concerning the lesser included
crime of criminally negligent homicide.
The defendant's sanity was not an issue at trial. Nor, directly, was
the defendant's religion, though most definitely the sincerity of his religious beliefs formed the underlying issue upon which his claim for including a charge of criminally negligent homicide rested. The knives and
hatchet were placed in Kenneth Goins' body during a religious ritual.
1. People v. Strong, 45 A.D.2d 18, 19, 356 N.Y.S.2d 200, 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), rev'd, 37
N.Y.2d 568, 338 N.E.2d 602, 376 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975).
2. Id. at 19, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
3. Id.
4. People v. Strong, 37 N.Y.2d 568, 570, 338 N.E.2d 602, 604, 376 N.Y.S.2d 87, 89.
5. People v. Strong, 45 A.D.2d at 18, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02.
6. Id. at 19, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
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7
Strong, the leader of a religious sect known as "Sudan Muslims,"
claimed the power to stop the circulation of blood, in accord with one of
the central beliefs of the religion.8 To demonstrate his power, and the
power of his religion, he placed the knives and hatchet into Goins, who
was a volunteer and one of Strong's more than seventy followers. 9 Various characterizations of this sequence of events appeared in the courts'
opinions: "subriission," 1° "demonstration,""1 "'religious rite,' "12"ceremony,""3 and "'religious ordeal.' 14 In any event, at least one of
Strong's followers testified at trial that Strong had performed such acts
numerous times before without injury to followers. 15
The issue on appeal involved a mens rea question. Under New York
law, a conviction of manslaughter in the second degree requires proof
that the defendant "recklessly" caused the death of another., 6 As the
Appellate Division observed, "A person acts 'recklessly' with respect to a
result when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that such result will occur." 1 7 Conversely, the mens rea
of criminally negligent homicide is defined as the failure "to perceive a
substantial and unjustifiable risk." 8 The essential question on appeal in
Strong was whether or not the defendant was aware of the risk.
Though both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals addressed the issue on the narrow grounds of whether or not any reason7. Id. at 18, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
8. People v. Strong, 37 N.Y.2d at 570-71, 338 N.E.2d at 604, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
9. People v. Strong, 45 A.D.2d at 19, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 21, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 204 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
13. People v. Strong, 37 N.Y.2d at 571, 338 N.E.2d at 604, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
14. Id. at 572, 338 N.E.2d at 605, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 571, 338 N.E.2d at 604, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
16. People v. Strong, 45 A.D.2d at 19, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 202. Specifically, "A person is guilty of
manslaughter in the second degree when... [hie recklessly causes the death of another person" N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.15 (1) (McKinney 1987).
17. Id. New York law defines "recklessly" in relevant part as when "[a] person acts recklessly
with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is
aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or
that such circumstance exists." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (3) (McKinney 1987).
18. Id. at 20, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 202. New York law defines 'criminal negligence" in relevant part
as when "[a] person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance
described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (4) (McKinney 1987).
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able view of the facts19 would permit a jury to convict on the lesser
grounds, the question here of "reasonable view" itself inescapably involves the judiciary in questions concerning the nature of religion and the
sincerity with which those beliefs are held. As the Appellate Division
viewed the events,
On no view of the evidence in this record is there warrant for a verdict of
guilty of criminally negligent homicide, since there is no basis on which the
jury could have found that defendant failed to perceive the risk inherent in
his actions .... To suggest that Goins' death was the result of negligence
simply defies logic and common sense. 20
In reversing, the Court of Appeals stated:
We view the record as warranting the submission of the lesser charge
of criminally negligent homicide since there is a reasonable basis upon
which the jury could have found that the defendant failed to perceive the
risk inherent in his actions.... Assuming that a jury would not believe that
the defendant was capable of performing the acts in question without harm
to the victim, it still could determine that this belief held by the defendant
and his followers was indeed sincere and
21 that defendant did not in fact
perceive any risk of harm to the victim.
The distinction here between recklessness and criminal negligence,
between awareness and unawareness of the risk, more fundamentally encompasses the distance between commonly held societal experience and a
particular, though admittedly unorthodox, religious view. The two
views-one commonly attributable to judges seeking worldly wisdom,
the other more commonly associated with mystics, seekers, and visionaries-are literally worlds apart.
A stark illustration of this world view division appears in the Strong
court's review of the particular exchange claimed to have taken place
between leader and follower. According to testimony at trial, shortly
before the knives and hatchet were inserted, Kenneth Goins said to the
22
defendant, "No Father," and Strong replied, "It will be all right, son." 23
Writing in dissent to the Court of Appeals' reversal, Judge Gabrielli
interpreted Strong's response as "obviously evincing an awareness of the
possible result of his actions."' 24 Though the court's majority opinion,
19. People v. Strong, 45 A.D.2d at 19, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 202; People v. Strong, 37 N.Y.2d at 570,
338 N.E.2d at 604, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
20. People v. Strong, 45 A.D.2d at 20, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
21. People v. Strong, 37 N.Y.2d at 571, 338 N.E.2d at 604, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90.
22. People v. Strong, 45 A.D.2d at 19, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
23. People v. Strong, 37 N.Y.2d at 572, 338 N.E.2d at 605, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (Gabrielli, J.,

dissenting).
24. Id. at 572, 338 N.E.2d at 605, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
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written by Judge Jasen, does not directly address this exchange, it would
be just as logical to read it as evidence of the defendant's sincere conviction, based on religious belief, that no danger was present. How one interprets such an exchange is as much, if not more, the product of one's
implicit assumptions concerning whether or not the defendant's beliefs
are sincere and his religion legitimate, than of rational, inferential analysis of the words actually exchanged.
Strong dramatically highlights the difficulties confronting courts
when arguably religious beliefs form the basis for acts or omissions leading to criminal charges requiring the prosecution to prove the defendant's precise mental state.2 5 In these types of cases, the line between
recklessness and negligence may appear quite thin. But the required determination between the two can unintentionally involve courts in questions of constitutional dimension concerning religion, the sincerity of
religious belief, and the constitutional boundaries constraining such decisions. Frequently, the distance between judicial wisdom based on societal
beliefs and the defendant's sincerely held unconventional religious beliefs
distorts the judiciary's method of analysis. Such distortion is especially
apparent, and dangerous, when intent is an element of criminal prosecutions involving defendants who either explicitly or implicitly base their
acts or omissions on their religious convictions.
This Comment proposes an alternative approach to such issues the creation of a defense of extraordinary religious reliance. Such a defense, based predominantly on the reasoning of the defense of extreme
emotional disturbance, discussed later in detail, 6 would permit defendants to seek either mitigation of sentence or inclusion of a lesser included
offense. The defense is designed to buttress the right of the individual
accused of illegal acts attributable to sincerely held religious beliefs to a
judgment free of reasoning predicated upon unconstitutional assumptions concerning religion. While theoretically available as an exculpatory
defense, extraordinary religious reliance will be offered here in more limited form so as to recognize the equally valid right society has in refusing
to permit free reign to religiously based conduct.
In more general terms, this Comment is concerned less with the decisions reached in such cases as it is with the method, or lack of method,
25. Strong will be returned to as an example of how this issue applies to a discussion of homicide. See infra note 237.
26. See infra notes 251-68 and accompanying text.
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courts use.27 Part I reviews Supreme Court decisions developing questions and answers concerning the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Part II examines the inconsistencies in analyses by lower courts in
light of the Supreme Court's rulings. Part III analyzes the impact such
inconsistent analyses have had on criminal cases involving intent and the
free exercise clause. Part IV offers alternatives, including the proposed
defense of extraordinary religious reliance, designed to create a more systematic analysis of the issue. The general purpose of advancing greater
uniformity in analysis in such cases is multidimensional. Greater uniformity would require judges to state explicitly their reasoning, not only
to preserve the subject matter for the defendant's possible appeal, but
also to protect society's right to be free from criminal conduct masquerading as religious action. Part V briefly revisits Strong and applies the
proposed defense of extraordinary religious reliance.28

II.

THE DEVELOPING SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS CONCERNING
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

A. Anarchy, Chaos,"Religion," and the Destruction of the Family
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether a defendant's religious belief could be the basis for a defense against the commission of an overt act punishable by law in Reynolds v. United States.29
The Reynolds Court upheld as constitutional the prosecution of
Mormons, then polygamists, for bigamy despite their assertion that such
prosecution abridged their right to the free exercise of their religion. The
Court specifically saw the issue as involving "the guilt of one who knowingly violates a law which has been properly enacted, if he entertains a
religious belief that the law is wrong." 3 0 The Court concluded that "religion" in the first amendment 31 was intended by the framers 32 to include
27. Error or discrepancy in method can, of course, lead to inconsistent results. See infra Sections II, III & IV.
28. For Section I, see infra notes 29-87 and accompanying text; for Section II, see infra notes
88-152 and accompanying text; for Section III, see infra notes 153-237 and accompanying text; for
Section IV, see infra notes 237-68 and accompanying text; and for Section V, see infra notes 269-275
and accompanying text.
29. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
30. Id. at 162.
31. The first amendment states in part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..... U.S. CONST. amend. I.

32. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162 ("The word 'religion' is not defined in the Constitution. We must
go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to
the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted."). Original intent concerning the religion clauses and definitions of religion appear more ambiguous than the Reynolds opinion
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religious opinions and beliefs alone.3 3 Therefore, the Court concluded

that "Congress... was left free to reach actions which were in violation
of social duties or subversive of good order. ' '34 Insofar as "polygamy has
always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe,"' 35 its very presence, by inference, a threat to democratic principles,3 6 the government may legitimately punish its practioners.3 7

Aside from the distinction drawn between conduct and religious beliefs,38 the Court's opinion is of interest here for two reasons. First, the
Reynolds Court asserted that to recognize as excusable the performance

of illegal actions based on religious beliefs would effectively lead to chios
and anarchy.39 Second, the Court refused to find any trace of bias in the
trial judge's instructions to the jury, though arguably the instructions so
colored the jury's impressions of the issue before them that acquittal was
inconceivable. The trial court had referred to the Mormon practice of
polygamy as delusional, using metaphoric language often associated with
illness or disease:
[Y]ou should consider what are to be the consequences to the innocent victims of this delusion. As this contest goes on, they multiply, and there are
pure-minded women and there are innocent children,-innocent in a sense
might suggest. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1158 (1988) ("The historical record is ambiguous.").
Too strict a reliance on original intent, assuming it could be satisfactorily determined, may create
additional problems as well. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1963)
(Brennan, J.,concurring) ("Surely the Framers did not dream of society as pervasively regulated by
the state as is ours. To ignore this fact and rigidly adhere to views characteristic of the Framers
could gravely imperil the freedoms sought by the two religion clauses.").
33. But see L. TRIBE, supra note 32 § 14-6, at 1183 n. 33 ("It is somewhat peculiar that the
distinction between belief and action would persist in the free exercise context, for the guarantee
refers explicitly to the exercise of religion and thus seems to extend by its own terms beyond thought
and talk.").
34. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 166 ("Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and which,
when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle
cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.").
37. Reynold's only consolation was that on petition for rehearing his sentence to two years at
hard labor was modified to remove the "hard labor" requirement because the "act of Congress under
which the indictment was found provide[d] for punishment by imprisonment only." Id. at 169.
Whether the initial sentence represented simple error or a strident call for retribution- bordering on
religious persecution-is a matter of conjecture.
38. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 14, at 1183-4.
39. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67 ("Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his
religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior
to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.").
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even beyond the degree of the innocence of childhood itself. These are to be
the sufferers; and as jurors fail to do their duty ...just so do these victims
multiply and spread themselves over the land.4'
If the Court's instructions appear startlingly biased and sexist to the
twentieth century reader, the Supreme Court's response may well, in retrospect, appear even more outlandishly blind. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Waite stated that "[a]ll the [trial] court did was to call the
attention of the jury to the particular character of the crime for which
the accused was on trial, and to remind them of the duty they had to
perform. There was no appeal to the passions, no instigation of
prejudice."4 1
The Supreme Court's finding, even today, is cause for serious concern because it perpetuates and magnifies the lower court's bias. Both
fear of anarchy and perpetuation of bias will be seen to represent recurring themes (and dangers) when reviewing later courts' rulings and analyses concerning criminal defendants who assert free exercise clause
defenses.
The Court had by no means finished with the Mormons. Ten years
after Reynolds, Davis v. Beason42 was decided. The Davis Court held constitutional a Territory of Idaho statute4 3 providing that members of the
Mormon Church were not entitled to vote or hold public office because
of their affiliation with an organization promoting bigamy and polygamy.' In writing the opinion, Justice Field left little doubt as to whether
or not he considered polygamy a legitimate religious belief: "To extend
exemption from punishment for such crimes would be to shock the moral
judgment of the community. To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is
to offend the common sense of mankind."4 5 The opinion follows Reyn40. Id. at 167-68.
41. Id. at 168.
42. 133 U.S. 333 (1899).
43. Id. at 335 n. 1. The statute stated in relevant part that "[n]o person... who is a bigamist or
a polygamist, or who teaches, advises, counsels or encourages any person or persons to become
bigamists, polygamists, or to commit any other crime defined by law, or to enter into what is known
as plural or celestial marriage, or who is a member of any order, organization or association which
teaches, advises, counsels or encourages its members or devotees, or any other person, to commit the
crime of bigamy or polygamy or any other crime defined by law, either as a rite or ceremony of such
order, organization or association or otherwise, is permitted to vote at any election or to hold any
position or office of honor, trust or profit within the Territory." A sworn oath of renuciation of such

belief was also required prior to registering to vote.
§ 501 (1889).

REVISED STATUTES OF IDAHO,

15th Session,

44. Davis, 133 U.S. at 347 (the statute "is not open to any constitutional or legal objection").
45. Id. at 341-42. Note how "common sense" appears as well in the Appellate Division opinion
in Strong. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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olds in condemning the advocacy of polygamy as a crime,4 6 and further
associates such advocacy with "acts inimical to the peace, good order
and morals of society."'4 7
Of particular interest here is the Davis Court's working definition of
religion, defining it as "one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to
the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and
of obedience to his will." 4 8 This definition, based as it is on the assumption that a divine being is necessary to constitute a bona fide religion, has
since become the source of frequent argument and concern.4 9 Shortly after Davis the Mormon Church ended its fight to have polygamy recognized as a legitimate religious value and practice.5 0
B. Limitations on Government Prosecution
The Supreme Court has determined, in its earlier5 1 as well as its
later 2 decisions, that compelling state interest, applied through criminal
laws that demonstrate secular purpose and effect, 5 3 generally are constitutionally valid in spite of religiously based challenges. Yet there are lim46. Davis, 133 U.S. at 345 ("Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion."). For Reynblds, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
The phrasing in Davis may imply aswell that the Court believed the Mormons were insincere in
holding polygamy as a religious belief (note the word "designate" in the quotation above). The
suggestion of duplicity upon the part of defendants and incredulity upon the part of courts runs
this Comment. See also infra note 144 and accompanying
throughout many of the cases discdssed iri
text (concerning questions of religion, sanity, and constitutional analysis).
47. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342.
48. Id.
49. See P.FERRARA, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: A REINTERPRETATION 115 (1983)
("Perhaps the most intractable problem in the entire seamless web of Anglo-American jurisprudence
is to define religion for the purposes of the First Amendment's religion clauses."). See generally
Choper, Defining "Religion"inthe FirstAmendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982) (advocating a
definition of religion based on the existence of "extratemporal consequences," at least for free exercise clause purposes); Note, Reinterpretingthe Religion Clauses: ConstitutionalConstruction and the
Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARv.L. REV. 1468 (1984) (arguing that, for free exercise clause purposes, a definition of religion should emphasize the belief's role in the formation of the believer's
identity, while for establishment claus& purposes, it should emphasize social consensus on the belief's religious nature); Note, The Sacredand the Profane:A FirstAmendment Definition of Religion,
61 TEX. L. REV. 139 (1982) (listing numerous sources concerning atterripts to define religion for free
exercise and establishment clause purposes).
50. Whether it did so because the Davis decision effectively disenfranchised it, or rather because
the Court in Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890), revoked the church's corporate
charter and took legal title to its property, is not clear. See P. FERRARA, supra note 49, at 114.
51. Reynolds, supra note 29; Davis, supra notes 42-3 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 55, 82, 86 and accompanying text.
53. See L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 14-10, at 1204 (The requirement of secular purpose) § 14-10,
at 1214 (The requirement of secular effect).
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its beyond which the Court will not go when considering the free exercise
of religion. Four years after the Court explicitly held the free exercise
clause applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 4
Ballard v. United States" was decided.
Ballard dealt with a mail fraud5 6 conviction reversed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 7 The Ballards used the mails to solicit contributions to their "I Am" movement. They asserted, inter alia, that they
could heal sufferers from diseases commonly assumed incurable, had
done so, had received dictation from Jesus, and had shaken his hand.58
The indictment charged that the defendants' "well knew" 59 that such
representations were false. The trial court in its instructions limited the
jury to considering the defendants' good faith and explicitly instructed
the jury to avoid speculation concerning the truth or falsity of the belief.6 0 On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions precisely because the trial judge limited the issue to one of good faith. 61 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the trial court was correct in not permitting
the jury to examine the truth or falsity of the religious belief. In upholding the validity of the trial court's limiting of the jury instructions, Justice Douglas wrote:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof
of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that
they may be beyond the ken62of mortals does not mean that they can be
made suspect before the law.
Justice Douglas' statement is particularly significant for defendants
charged with criminal acts based on religiously motivated conduct. The
Ballard opinion limited examination of religious belief to the sincerity
with which the belief was held. Such judicial tolerance for the unique and
54. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (held unconstitutional as a
censorship of religion Connecticut's licensing procedure that permitted a government official to determine whether a religion was truly a religion). The Court in Cantwell reasoned that "[s]uch a
censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected
by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is- within the protection of the Fourteenth." Id.
55. 322 U.S. 78 (1943).
56. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 79.
57. Id. at 83.
58. Id. at 80-81.
59. Id. at 80.
60. Id. at 81-82.
61. Id. at 83.
62. Id. at 86-87.
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bizarre has been rare.6 3 Ultimately the case was remanded to the Circuit
Court of Appeals' and the indictment later dismissed after the case appeared again before the Supreme Court because women were intention65
ally and systematically excluded from both the petit and grand jury.
Ballard'ssignificance lies not only in the Court's distinction between
unconstitutionally examining the truth of religious beliefs and constitutionally examining the sincerity with which those beliefs are held, but
also in the questions raised in Justice Jackson's dissent.6 6 Before mulling
over the wrong done those who honestly "seek vaguely for truth and
beauty and moral support"'67 by those false prophets who spread "spiritual poison, ' ' 6 1 and after finding nothing but "humbug ' 69 in the "I Am"
movement, Justice Jackson asks how,
[w]e can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to
what is believable. The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to show that they have been true in his experience. Likewise, that
one knowingly falsified is best proved by showing that what he said happened never did happen. How can the Government prove these persons
false? If we try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate
the dispute from the very considerations which in common experience provide its most reliable answer.7 °
The attempt to separate in the mind of the trier of fact the sincerity
of the religious belief from the truthfulness of the belief, and by instruction to attempt to keep the trier of fact from determining sincerity
through comparing the defendant's religion with that of the trier's own,
has in practice had debatable results. 7' To assert the need for more uniform and explicit efforts to chart the boundaries of constitutionally per63. "Rare" may be an overstatement, but certainly the results are mixed. See infra section II.
Implicit rejection, slightly more subdued in tone, has already been seen. See, e.g., supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
64. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 88.
65. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
66. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 95.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 92.
70. Id. at 92-93.
71. See infra section II. Frequently such inconsistency can only be inferred from what has not
been stated. Thus in Reynolds, for instance, the Court found that the trial court did nothing more
than clarify the issue by finding that the Mormon practice of polygamy constituted conduct based on
delusional thinking. This implies that the Court assumed that a desire to practice polygamy must be
the product of delusional thinking, rather than sincerely held religious belief. Regardless of the merits of the conclusion, the absence of reasoning to support it casts doubts on the Court's objectivity.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text. If courts are more than capable of such assumptions and
omissions, what might be the reasoning of the jury? See also infra note 72 and accompanying text; L.
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missible inquiry is one essential purpose of this Comment. The danger, as
Justice Jackson recognized in Ballard, is attributable in part to the fact
that religious experiences "cannot be verified to the minds of those whose
field of consciousness does not include religious insight. When one comes
to trial which turns on any aspect of religious belief or representation,
unbelievers among his judges are likely not to understand and are almost
certain not to believe him."' 72 Justice Jackson's plea that sincerity of religious belief should also be an impermissible question for the trier of fact
has largely gone unheeded.7 3
Ballard does not hold that a deity is necessary for a belief to be
legitimately religious and worthy of free exercise clause protection.74
Though the Supreme Court has never so held on purely constitutional
grounds, it has considered a more expanded definition of religion when a
statutory underpinning exists. In United States v. Seeger 75 the Court examined the statutory exemption for conscientious objectors to the draft,
viewing Congress' substitution of "Supreme Being" for "God" as a
broadening of the protection extended to religious beliefs. 76 The Court's
test became, "does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of
the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly
qualified for exemption? ' 77 Though the Court insisted its analysis and
definition applied only to the limited area of statutory language concerning the draft, 78 its application may extend beyond such narrow confines.79 In theory, this broadening of the definition of religion should
narrow the range of sincerely held beliefs the government can
TRIBE, supranote 32, § 14-12, at 1245 ("The perception of the claimant's sincerity inevitably reflects
the fact finder's view of the reasonableness of the claimant's beliefs").
72. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 93 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
73. See L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 14-12, at 1245 (analyzing when Justice Jackson's views seem
most and least persuasive). See also Weiss, Privilege, Posture andProtection: "Religion" in the Law,
73 YALE L.J. 593 (1964).
74. Ballard represents "a move away from the equation of religion with belief in a deity." Note,
The Sacred and the Profane:A First Amendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEx. L. REv. 139, 145
(1982).
75. 380 U.S. 163 (1964).
76. Id. at 175.
77. Id. at 184.
78. Id. at 174.
79. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (developing a
three part test to determine what constitutes "religion." See infra note 111 and accompanying text).
But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971) (expressing a more traditional view of religion);
Choper, supra note 49, at 589 ("But the Seeger definition's promise for attaining constitutional status
has been measurably diminished by the Court's subsequent treatment of the problem .... "). See
infra note 115.
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challenge."0
Another aspect of the question concerning actions based on religious
beliefs is how central those beliefs are to the religious identity of those
who hold them. In effect, the more central those beliefs and the actions
stemming from them are to the religion, the more persuasive is the believers' argument that depriving them of the opportunity to practice
those beliefs would infringe upon their religious freedom."s In Wisconsin

v. Yoder, 2 for example, the centrality of the Amish belief that "life aloof

from the world"8 3 in a "church-oriented community ' 8 4 was necessary to
the continued existence of the religious community weighed heavily in

the Court's decision to recognize the group's exemption from compulsory school attendance laws that would have held the parents criminally

responsible for their failure to require their childrens' attendance.85 Yet
just how "central" is central enough remains unanswered. 86
While the Court has attempted to establish broad, categorical

boundaries with respect to what constitutes religion, sincerely held religious beliefs, and those areas of governmental interest sufficiently compelling to curtail religious freedom of expression, serious questions
remain concerning not only the boundaries themselves, but also the assumptions that underlie their construction. As one commentator has succinctly stated it:
80. One commentator has suggested the possible impact such a broad definition of religion
would have on the Court's response to religiously-based claims: "It is unlikely that an extremely
broad definition of religion will be permitted to coexist with an extremely generous protection of the
claims that fall within that definition." Choper, supra note 49, at 592. Implicit in such a characterization of the interrelationship between broadness of definition and extent of protection is the notion
that, regardless of apparent change, the status quo is likely to remain.
81. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 14-12, at 1246 ("Closely related to the question of sincerity is the
element of how substantially the prohibition or requirement burdens the religion. Clearly a conflict
which threatens the very survival of the religion or the core values of a faith poses more serious free
exercise problems than does a conflict which merely inconveniences the faithful.").
82. 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
83. Id. at 210.
84. Id. at 217.
85. Id. at 230-31.
86. Centrality alone no more defines religion than does, for example, the length of time a belief
has been held by a group, though its importance has been recognized, see supra note 81, and is of
importance to the discussion here. See also infra note 267 and accompanying text.
Cases such as Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S.Ct. 1310 (1986) (Air force regulation preventing
serviceman from wearing his yarmulke does not offend free exercise clause, given military context),
are readily distinguishable as concerning military regulations, where constitutional deprivations traditionally have been tolerated to a much greater degree. As the Court pointed out in Goldman, "Our
review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than
constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society." Id. at 1313.
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[T]he dangers of undue governmental involvement in matters of personal
faith cannot be wholly eliminated. However generous a test of sincerity and
centrality is adopted, however hard courts try not to impose any uniform
orthodoxy, and however genuinely they attempt to limit evidence in such
cases to extrinsic indications of fraud, they are already engaged in a treacherous business indeed when they try to assess the place that religion occu87
pies in a person's life or the sincerity with which religious views are held.

III. THE LOWER

COURTS AND INCONSISTENT TREATMENT

Treacherous indeed have been lower courts' attempts to apply the
broad standards the Supreme Court has constructed for analysis of religiously based contentions. Yet the pattern such analyses should follow is
clearly present. Broadly speaking, for such cases, constitutional review
requires first a determination concerning the threshold question of
whether or not the claimant's action is based upon religious belief. If so,
the court must next determine the sincerity with which the religious belief is held. If the claimant's action is based on a belief both religious and
sincere, then the first amendment mandates that the government demonstrate the restriction placed on the claimant's religiously based action
furthers a compelling state interest. 88 Further, the restriction must reasonably satisfy the dictates of the least restrictive means doctrine. 89 As
this section will show, the above four-step analysis leaves open multiple
possibilities for error by the courts. The significance of such errors becomes clear when it is noted that attempts by courts to determine intent
in criminal prosecutions often require the trier of fact to infer from actions and other evidence the precise state of mind of the defendant. If the
constitutionally permissible scope of review is incorrectly gauged, subsequent findings concerning intent based on such review become tainted as
well.
A.

Are the Beliefs Based on Religion?

Prison inmates often rely on the free exercise clause to seek injunctive relief or civil damages against prison administrators. 90 The Supreme
87. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 14-12, at 1251.
88. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1054 (2d ed. 1983)
(for a general statement of the analytic process).
89. See Sherbert v. Vernei, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Azeeze v. Fairman, 604 F. Supp. 357, 363
(D.C. I1. 1985) (government must show restriction "is among the least restrictive means reasonably
available .... ") rev'd on other grounds 795 F.2d 1296; P. FERRARA, supra note 49, at 115.
90. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 327 n. 7 and accompanying text (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 812
(1977).
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Court has recognized that incarceration itself does not justify stripping
an inmate of his religious freedoms,9" though certain restrictions may
apply.9 2 In Jones v. Bradley9 3 the inmate was denied use of the prison
chapel for several reasons,9 4 including the prison chaplains' conclusion
that "they [the prison officials] did not recognize the [inmate's beliefs] as
a religion." 95 The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no constitutional violation because prison administrators neither denied the inmate
reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith nor used unreasonable restriction "to maintain order and security."'9 6 While the court stated it did not
reach the question of whether or not the inmate's beliefs constituted a
religion,97 the conflict might never have reached the lower court had the
prison chaplains been half so circumspect. In avoiding the question, the
court implicitly condoned subjective determination by prison authorities
of what constitutes a religion. These determinations are, in effect, free
from review, and thus available to form the basis for denial of possibly
protected rights. Similarly, the court's conclusion that, even assuming
the claimant's beliefs did constitute a religion,9" still no free exercise
rights were abridged,99 remains suspect because no attempt was made to
determine if the least restrictive means were used to meet the state's interest in security and order.
A more pressing and often ignored distinction is that the question of
whether beliefs or practices are religious or not is one of fact, not law.
Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriatex ° Requiring trial
helps avoid even the appearance of impropriety, as it removes the "spec91. Cruz, 405 U.S. at 321 ("Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including prisoners.").
92. Id. at 322 n. 2.
93. 590 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1979).
94. Id. at 296. Other reasons given were that the prisoner proposed no outside sponsor, the
chapel was requested for "study groups," not religious services, and no other room request was
made.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 295-96.
98. In a different context, the danger of assuming beliefs constitute religion is well illustrated by
Founding Church of Scientology of Washington v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969). There the prosecution did not contest a prima facie case made out
by the defendant that its organization constituted a religion. By not contesting the organization's
status, the government undermined its own case concerning the status of literature as "labeling" for
purposes of condemnation under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq. (1964).
99. Jones, 590 F.2d at 296-97.
100. Patrick v. Le Fevre, 745 F.2d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[I1t was improper to grant the
summary judgment motion, where resolution of the dispositive issues squarely implicated the claimant's state of mind").

1987]

GOD INA CAGE

tre that the sincerity issue was decided by reference to the factfinder's
Court
perception of what a religion should resemble." ' The Supreme
10 2

has recognized the need for factfinding in such situations.
B. Are the Beliefs Religious Beliefs?

1. Secular Beliefs. While courts may conclude that the asserted
religious motive for a claimant's conduct represents but a fraudulent attempt to deceive, 10 3 the courts may also conclude that the asserted belief
constitutes secular rather than religious thought. Again, the danger is
that courts may conclude from unspoken and perhaps unconstitutional
assumptions as to what constitutes a religion that the claimant's views do

not merit free exercise clause protection."° Beliefs must be viewed to
determine if, in the petitioner's "own scheme of things,"10 5 the views are
religious. Emphasis must be placed on the subjective rather than on the
objective view if a broader definition is to be used. 106
In Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,0 7 the Third Circuit attempted to apply what it considered a more useful analytic standard for
what constitutes a "religion" than any the Supreme Court had so far
offered. Its attempt had mixed results. Frank Africa, a member of

MOVE, 108 sincerely believed that his beliefs required him to follow a
strict dietary regime.' 0 9 The court concluded that his beliefs were secular
101. Id. at 157.
102. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
103. See generally United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968); see also Le Fevre,
745 F.2d at 156; Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974).
104. Le Fevre, 745 F.2d at 157 ("Properly cognizant of the judiciary's incapacity to judge the
religious nature of an adherent's beliefs, courts have jettisoned the objective, content-based approach
previously employed to define religious belief in favor of a more subjective definition of religion,
which examines an individual's inward attitudes towards a particular belief system."). Whether such
a change in focus has increased the capacity to judge accurately is left open.
105. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185.
106. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
107. 662 F.2d 1025 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982).
108. The court, using quotations from the defendant's papers and testimony, determined that
MOVE was
a "revolutionary" organization "absolutely opposed to all that is wrong." MOVE was
founded, although the record does not reveal when, by John Africa, who serves as the
group's revered "coordinator" and whose teachings Frank Africa and his fellow "family" members follow. MOVE has no governing body or official hierarchy; instead, because "everything is level" and "there are no ups or downs," all MOVE members,
including John Africa, occupy an equivalent position within the organization. In fact,
MOVE really has only "one member, one family, one body" since, according to Frank
Africa, to talk to an individual MOVE "disciple" is to "talk to everybody."
Id. at 1026.
109. Id. at 1025.
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in nature rather than religious. The court pointed out that "[t]he
Supreme Court has never announced a comprehensive definition of religion for use in cases such as the present one"" 0 and went on to announce
its own three part test:
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do
with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is comprehensive in
nature; it consists of a belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching.
Third, a religion often can be recognized by the presence of certain formal
and external signs." 1 '

In applying the test the court concluded that Africa had failed the ultimate questions criterion because his purported pantheism did not fit the

common definitions for the word.

2

Both definitions of pantheism relied

on by the court' make use of a conception of "God,"" ' 4 a requirement
the Supreme Court has before deemed suspect. 115 The court also acknowledged that its conclusion that Africa's views were not comprehen1

3

sive, the second part of the test, was "not unassailable."" 16 Finally, that
"MOVE lacks almost all of the formal, identifying characteristics common to most recognized religions""' 7 was conceded in a note" 8 as not
determinative in reviewing whether a belief constitutes a religion. In clos110.

Id. at 1031.

111. Id. at 1032. This three part test is taken from Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200 (Adams,
J., concurring) (teaching of transcendental meditation in certain New Jersey public schools violates
the establishment clause). As the court in Africa stated, "It is not controlling for our analysis that
Africa advances his religious claim under the free exercise clause, whereas Malnak involved an establishment clause inquiry. The same standards appear to govern the definition-of-religion determination in both contexts." Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032, n. 14 (citing to Malnak, 592 F.2d at 210-13
(Adams, J., concurring opinion)).
112. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1033.
113. Id. at n.16.
114. Pantheism is "[t]he religious belief or philosophical theory that God and the universe are
identical (implying a denial of the personality and transcendence of God; the doctrine that God is
everything and everything is God)" Id. (definition from 2 COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2067 (1971)). The Court also relied on MacIntyre, Pantheism, in 6 ENcYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 31, 36 (1967) ("Pantheism is usually a doctrine that occurs in a religious

and philosophical context in which there are already tolerably clear conceptions of God and the
universe and the question has arisen how these two conceptions are related .... Pantheism essentially involves two assertions; that everything that exists constitutes a unity and that this all-inclusive
unity is divine.").
115. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text; but see P. FERRARA, supra note 49, at 117
("The drawback of such a broad definition is that it requires the indulgence of the truly eccentric and
worse. But there appears to be no principled way to avoid this problem, and courts can minimize the
cost of such indulgence when weighing in each case, the other factors involved in making the final
decision.").
116. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035.
117. Id. at 1036.
118. Id. at n. 21.
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ing, the court stated that the record did not explain why Africa. was denied his dietary requests while female MOVE members in another
Pennsylvania prison did receive the special diet.11 9 Casting doubt on the
state's contentions, the court left open the possibility of Frank Africa
challenging the dietary restrictions on other grounds, 12 0 finding for the
state solely as a direct consequence of its decision "that MOVE is not a
religion." 121
Why did the court determine that MOVE did not constitute a religion? The answer may well be based less on the court's assurance as to its
competency to identify religion as on its concerns as to thepossible consequences of so deciding. The prison superintendent had testified that
recognizing MOVE as a religion would possibly lead to "a proliferation
of other groups" requesting special diets and MOVE attracting new
"sympathizers."' 2 2 More directly, the court stated that:
Indeed, if Africa's statements are deemed sufficient to 'describe a religion
under the Constitution, it might well be necessary to extend first amendment protection to a host of individuals and organizations who espouse personal and secular ideologies, however 12much
those ideologies appear
3
dissimilar to traditional religious dogmas.
The quiet language in the quotation faintly echoes of the Reynolds
Court's fear that polygamy would destroy democracy.' 24 Other courts
have responded to such fears as well, frequently ignoring in the process
25
discussion of less restrictive means to satisfy compelling state interests. 1
Courts may quickly dismiss discussion of less restrictive means after
finding the state's interest compelling if they consider the claimant's
119. Id. at 1037.
120. Id. at 1036, n. 23. The Court suggested that if Africa could show that physical harm resulted from his body's inability to tolerate non-raw food (testimony revealed that years had passed
since he had eaten such food), then possibly "the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment" would come into play.
121. Id. at 1036-37.
122. Id. at 1028.
123. Id. at 1034.
124. See supra notes 29, 38-40 and accompanying text.
125. Such has been the result in a number of cases. See, e.g., In re M.I. v. A.I., 107 Misc. 2d 663,
435 N.Y.S.2d 928 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981) (non-support case based on spouse's refusal to support
family. Family not required to live with him in religious Temple. The court held that "[it is axiomatic that civilization would be driven to extinction, but for the productivity contributed by those
members able to provide for the sustenance of themselves and those dependent upon them." Id. at
931). See also Wright v. DeWitt School Dist. No. 1, 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965) (court
recognized compelling state interest in required smallpox vaccinations but failed to consider alternatives for religious group protesting the requirements).
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cause unworthy. In Brown v. Wainwright,126 the court determined that
the government's arguments concerning personal cleanliness and identification under prison conditions were compelling enough to deny the inmate his allegedly religiously based request to keep his mustache. 127 The
inmate alleged that "he is a demigod, 'an offspring of a God and Mortal',
and that his mustache is a gift from his creator. He states that he is an

established religion." 121
Such a case may appear absurd, but it is presented here for two
reasons. First, the Eighth Circuit, in a factually similar case, Teterud v.
Burns, 129 upheld a prison inmate's request that his hair be kept long for
religious reasons, in violation of a prison regulation requiring all inmates
to have short hair. The court there found that the state's compelling interests-including personal cleanliness and identification-were insufficient because less restrictive means were available: hair can be washed,
and new photographs taken. t3I In Teterud a native American Indian was
the petitioner,13 1 and his belief was found to be a sincerely religious one
by the district court.1 32 The discrepancy in treatment between the two
cases may best be understood in the respective courts' response to the
religious beliefs asserted: the difference between the (stated) refusal to
judge the orthodoxy of one belief,1 33 and the (unstated) assumption that
the other is frivolous. 134 Second, and more important here, curt treatment of a petitioner's belief may be justified if the court indeed concludes
the claim is frivolous. But an assertion as in Brown that the petitioner is a
demigod does raise the question of distinguishing among the religiously
sincere, the frivolous, and the insane.
2. DelusionalBeliefs. In Brown v. Pena,135 the court denied plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis by refusing to "provide a cer126. 419 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970).
127. Id. at 1377.
128. Id. at 1376.
129. 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
130. Id. at 361. See also People v. Lewis, 115 A.D.2d 597, 496 N.Y.S.2d 258 (2d. Dept.1985)
(less restrictive means available to photograph prisoner who as a Rastafarian had not cut his hair for

twenty to twenty-five years).
131. Teterud, 522 F.2d at 358.
132. Id. at 359.
133. Id. at 360.
134. Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d at 1376 (that the court found the case frivolous may be
inferred from its statement that "we have concluded on the merits that this case is of such character
as not to justify oral argument.")
135. 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
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tificate that the appeal [was] taken in good faith."' 3 6 Brown had claimed
he had lost his job due to religious discrimination, and sued the Director
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for dismissing the
charges he had filed.' 3 7 The court stated that "plaintiff's belief in pet
food does not qualify legally as a religion."' 3 8 Brown had apparently'3 9

claimed that his ingestion of Kozy Kitten People/Cat Food had significantly improved his work performance," 4 that his belief was a religious

one, and that it was the cause of his firing.
Whether such claims demonstrate an absence of good faith and
hence are frivolous, or rather demonstrate questionable mental compe" ' Certainly, to quote somewhat out of contency remains in doubt. 14
142
"[t]he difficulty of the investigation is compounded where the
text,

relevant belief does not, on its face, fit into any generally recognizable
religious framework."' 143 That sincerely held religious beliefs may never-

theless appear to many as bordering on the insane is a serious concern as
well, for "[a] religious belief can appear to every other member of the
human race preposterous, yet merit the protection of the Bill of Rights.
Popularity, as well as verity, are inappropriate criteria."'"
136. Id. at 1383.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1385.
139. Id. at 1384. The precise argument is not clear from the opinion.
140. Id.
141. No empirical evidence has been found to permit a firm decision concerning the frequency
with which claims are decided on the assumption they are frivolous when questions of competency
could equally well be raised. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
142. Stevens v. Burger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 900 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (context goes directly to questions surrounding those who seek to act on religious beliefs).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 899. The difficulty presented here raises constitutional, religious, and psychiatric
questions concerning determinations of intent in both the civil and criminal contexts. In evaluating
state of mind the courts are faced not with precise categories of belief, but rather with a continuum of
belief, ranging from the conventionally accepted sane to the obviously insane. At one end of the
continuum stand traditional religious beliefs, generally accepted and protected without question. At
some point along the continuum the courts reach a point representing the outer limits of constitutionally protected religious belief, however unconventional. The problem in terms of determining
state of mind, though, is that the continuum does not end with the Constitution's limit. Beyond, run
the unconventional beliefs that do not receive constitutional protection, yet might suggest to an
observer the presence of disturbed mental reasoning. Further still, at the far end of the continuum,
stand beliefs so bizarre that questions of constitutional protection based upon the free exercise clause
give way without discussion to questions of sanity. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
While little danger of misjudgment may attend this last group, the group immediately before it, those
who hold unconventional beliefs not protected by the constitution yet potentially suggestive of disturbed mental reasoning and who act on such beliefs, stands in danger of at best neglect and at worst,
in the criminal context, of receiving and serving prison sentences without provision for the psychiatrichelp they may need. See infra note 241. Conceivably our legal system's presumption of sanity, see,

720
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The line between justifiable examination of mental state for competency, and unconstitutional covert or overt inquiry concerning truth or
falsity of religious beliefs, is a fine and dangerous one.' 45 The court in
Hollon v. Pierce1 46 juxtaposed in the same paragraph both the legitimate
need for, and the danger of, such examination:
Irrationality takes many outward forms. Mental aberrations just as readily
assume a religious guise as not. That an aberration is expressed in religious
terms does not foreclose good faith inquiry into the aberration itself. Such
an inquiry by those responsible for the employee's fitness is not an invasion
of his private religious beliefs.... Certainly, an investigation of competence
would not be tolerated if it cloaked
a prohibited inquiry into unorthodox
47
belief or an act of religious bias.'

In Hollon the question was the loss of a job. t4 In Mayock v. Martin 149
the Court had no trouble in agreeing that Peter Mayock suffered from
delusions with religious content.' 5 0 Mayock had already put out one of
his eyes and cut off one of his hands because of his belief that God required such acts. The mere possibility of his cutting off his foot justified
his continued commitment though Mayock did not represent a danger to
5
others and had "not done any self-injurious act in twenty years."' '1
No questions of constitutional free exercise dimension arise from
eg., Eule, The PresumptionofSanity: Bursting the Bubble, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637 (1978), permits
judges to brand as frivolous, actions or defenses based on beliefs whose content simply happens to be
religious, rather than face serious and difficult questions concerning the person's competency or
sanity. Paradoxically, the First Amendment's protection of religion, extended as it has been to encompass beliefs unconventi6nal in the extreme, may actually, due to judicial hesitancy to examine
such beliefs, condemn some who suffer from mental disturbance to prison. Much of the above reasoning might well apply with equal force to civil commitment cases.
145. See, e.g., notes 179, 274 and accompanying text.

146. 257 Cal. App. 2d 468, 64 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1967).
147. Id. at 477, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 814 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 471, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
149. 157 Conn. 56, 245 A.2d 574 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1111 (1969).
150. That the Court had no trouble agreeing that delusional as opposed to religious belief was of
concern here can be inferred from the absence of any discussion of the point in the case. Further,
that Mayock alone held the belief is of significance: beliefs or experience of members of religious or
other subcultural groups may be difficult to distinguish from delusions or hallucinations. When such
experiences are shared and accepted by a subcultural group they should not be considered evidence
of psychosis.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS 188 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM III]. In dissent in Mayock, acting Justice Shea did
note that "in times less skeptical [Mayock] might have been venerated as a saint or prophet." 157
Conn. at 65, 245 A.2d at 579 (Shea, J., dissenting).
151. Mayock, 157 Conn. at 65, 245 A.2d at 576. But see Ewing, Schall v. Martin: Preventive
Detention andDangerousness Through the Looking Glass, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 173 (1985) (clinical
and statistical predictions of dangerousness "are more likely to prove wrong than right." Id. at 225).

1987]

GOD INA CAGE

Mayock. The constitutional danger emerges when, paradoxically again,
judges simply rely on a constitutional free exercise clause analysis that

masks distinctions between religious belief and delusional thinking, or
rather, attempt to make constitutional determinations of what qualifies
as a religion or religious belief without clearer guidance than that now
available. 152
The areas covered in this section have highlighted the difficulties

facing courts when confronted with questions of religion, sincerity of religious belief, compelling state interest, and least restrictive means. As has

been seen, such decisions often require courts to give meaning and content to broad constitutional categories and boundaries. The stakes, and

perhaps the difficulties as well, can only be said to increase in the criminal context, where decisions involving precise mens rea requirements can
dramatically affect a defendant's liberty.
IV.

CRIMINAL CASES, INTENT AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

DEFENSE: ANALYSIS APPLICABLE, INAPPLICABLE,
CONSISTENT AND INCONSISTENT

Criminal prosecutions of individuals or groups whose actions or
omissions have been predicated on religious belief generate mens rea
questions ranging from general criminal negligence to purposeful, intentional awareness.1 53 While the categories of offenses presented are not
inclusive,' 54 they do illustrate the complex and tangled analysis that results when religiously based behavior has significantly conflicted with
152. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
153. For definitions of specific mens rea requirements, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL
PENAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFT

§ 2.02 (General Requirements of Culpability) (1962). Section

2.02(2)(c) states in relevant part that "[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of
an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct."
Section 2.02(2)(d) states in relevant part that "[a] person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct."
154. Discussion of all the categories is beyond the scope of this Comment, though inclusiveness
as to subject area is not needed to support the argument advanced. Related areas include such diverse concerns as criminal prosecutions for tax evasion, see, e.g., United States v. Sun Myung Moon,
718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984), and for kidnaping, see, e.g., Chatwin
v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946).
Further, conscientious objector cases have long perplexed the courts. See, e.g., Kramer v. United
States, 147 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1945) (World War II); United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir.
1943) (World War II); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918) (World War I); Ex parte
Stringer, 38 Ala. 457 (1863) (Civil War, Confederate conscientious objector); White v. M'Bride, 7
Ky. (4 Bibb) 61 (1815) (apparently for War of 1812; Quaker conscientious objector).
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criminal law prohibitions. That a number of the cases only indirectly
raise questions of intent is immaterial for the discussion. The essential
purposes are, first, to explore the interrelationship between religiously
motivated behavior and criminal law, and the extent to which the law
recognizes or ignores the element of religion through the intent elements
requisite for conviction. The second is to note the constitutional questions concerning the free exercise of religion that, today, could be raised
in defense of individuals charged with violation of criminal laws. Selected
cases will be treated to suggest the scope of the controversies.
A. Faith Healing
The character of the numerous prosecutions 5 in this area is generally a function of who is being charged: the practitioner or those who
have sought the practitioner's aid.
1. Practitioners. In People v. Cole, 56 the defendant, a Christian
Science healer in New York City operating out of an office on Fifth Avenue, was convicted of "the crime of practicing medicine without lawful
authorization and registration" 5 7 in violation of the Public Health Law.
The New York Medical Society had sent an investigator pretending to be
in need of treatment to Cole's office in order to gather evidence as to
Cole's practice. Cole's treatment consisted of the following:
The defendant during the interviews stated to the witness that she had

as much power to heal disease as he had, and could do so as well if she
would study the Bible and rely upon its promises and offer the prayer of
understanding and faith. She understood him when he asserted that he

could cure disease as saying58 that he could bring about the cure by means of
prayer to Almighty God.
Cole prayed for her, silently, for fifteen or twenty minutes each session.
The New York Court of Appeals found that Cole had engaged in
treatment within the meaning of the Public Health Law, even though he
had neither diagnosed the investigator's "illness" nor had he prescribed
any form of medicine or physical treatment.' 59 However, the governing
New York Law had an express exemption for "the practice of the religious tenets of any church." 60 The State had conceded that Christian
155. See, e.g., I. RUBENSTEIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CULTS 34-64 (1948).
156. 219 N.Y. 98, 113 N.E. 790 (1916).
157. Id. at 100, 113 N.E. at 791.
158. Id. at 104-5, 113 N.E. at 792.
159. Id. at 109, 113 N.E. at 794.
160. Id. at 102, 113 N.E. at 791.
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Science was a religion. 6 ' Since "[t]he exception in the statute is not con162
fined to worship or belief but includes the practice of religious tenets,"
Cole's conviction required reversal.
In relation to criminal law, constitutional law, and intent, Cole is
important for two reasons. First, the court recognized that the church
tenets must be practiced in "good faith"' 6 3 in order to qualify for the
statutory exemption, thus prefiguring the Ballard Court's analysis of the
sincerity of religiously held belief in relation to possible fraud charges by
nearly thirty years.' Second, the court carefully noted that the New
York statutory exception had precise boundaries: "It does not relate to or
except persons practicing in accordance with individual belief."' 165 Only
the practice of tenets authorized by recognized churches was protected.

Given today's expansive reading of what constitutes religion and religious belief,'66 it is difficult to imagine that such a narrow interpretation
of a statute like the New York one could withstand a constitutional free
exercise challenge.' 6 7
The clearer distinction between permissible faith healing and imper-

missible medical practice rests on a precise analysis of the respective actions performed.' 68 One year after Cole, the New York Court of Appeals
in People v. Vogelgesang'69 implicitly recognized more objective standards for analysis of what, in effect, represents implied intent. The defendant, a member of the New York Association of Spiritualists, had
treated a sufferer from fatal heart disease with linament and internal
medicines. He claimed the statutory exception as did the defendant in

Cole.170 In distinguishing the defendant's position from that established

in Cole, Justice Cardozo noted that "[b]ut things were done by this de161. Id. at 107, 113 N.E. at 793.
162. Id. at 110, 113 N.E. at 794.
163. Id. at 111, 113 N.E. at 794. Notice as well that "practice" by definition implies acts beyond
simple belief.
164. See supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
165. Cole, 219 N.Y. at 110, 113 N.E. at 794.
166. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
167. But see infra note 187 (in relation to endangering the welfare of a child, applicable to
parents who rely on faith healing for their children).
168. As Chief Justice Waite stated in Reynolds, "Congress was deprived of all legislative power
over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. As commentators have noted, however, "After
1960, the belief-action distinction would be replaced by tests that would place meaningful limits on
the government's ability to regulate actions essential to the exercise of religion." J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1057 (2d ed. 1983).

169. 221 N.Y. 290, 116 N.E. 977 (1917).
170. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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fendant which no good faith could justify. He combined faith with patent
medicine. If he invoked the power of spirit, he did not forget to prescribe
drugs." 17 ' The purpose of such a distinction soon became clear:
The law, in its protection of believers, has other cures in mind. The tenets to
which it accords freedom, alike of practice and of profession, are not merely
tenets, but the religious tenets, of a church. The profession and the practice
of the religion must be itself the cure. The sufferer's mind must be brought
into submission to the infinite mind, and in this must be the healing. The
operation of the power of spirit must be, not indirect and remote, but direct
and immediate. If that were not so, a body of men who claimed divine
inspiration might prescribe drugs and perform surgical operations under
cover of the law.' 72
The analysis in Vogelgesang attempts a principled discernment of "good
faith" based upon inferences drawn from the objective evidence available.
In effect, the attempt to infer the sincerity of the religious belief takes
precedence over the statutory reliance, as in Cole, on recognized church
affiliation. Nowhere in the opinion does Cardozo rely on the Cole reasoning distinguishing recognized church tenets and individual belief. The
court does, however, conclude in sustaining the defendant's conviction,
that the trial judge's charge to the jury that "the defendant had not the
right to practice religion for pay"1' 73 represented harmless error. However harmless the error was for purposes of appeal in Vogelgesang, such a
statement by the trial judge illustrates the danger that judicial assumptions concerning religion might conceivably be unconsciously conveyed
to juries. This possibility reiterates the need for a closer review of the
assumptions and their possible effects on juries. 174
2. Patients and Parents. Criminal conviction of those who rely on
faith healers generally requires the state to prove only criminal negligence. Conviction or acquittal usually rests on the status of the "patient":
adults who rely on treatment for themselves often avoid criminal sanctions; adults who rely on treatment for their children face criminal conviction for the practice of their religious belief.
Why adults who rely on faith healing avoid criminal sanctions is
171. Vogelgesang, 221 N.Y. at 292-93, 116 N.E. at 978.
172. Id. at 29.3. In passing should be noted Justice Cardozo's invocation of chaos should religious belief be permitted unleashed reign. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
173. Id.
174. Compare this statement by the trial judge with the trial judge's statement in Reynolds as to
the "delusional" nature of religiously required or permitted polygamy. Both exhibit unstated assumptions as to the proper, limited role of religion and religious practitioners. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.

1987]

GOD INA CAGE

rather obvious: invariably the result initiating criminal inquiry is death,
and prosecutions for successful suicide are rare, to say the least. A related area that by analogy may expose the theoretical scope of the issue
involves those adults who for religious reasons refuse certain medical
treatment, most commonly blood transfusions medically required during
surgery. In Erickson v. Dilgard 7 5 the court held that, absent a question
as to competency, the refusal by an adult to accept blood during an operation constituted a choice as to medical treatment the patient had a right
to make. Because medical decisions are subject to varying judgment, the
refusal did not constitute an attempt to commit suicide, a violation of the
Penal Law.' 7 6 However, such reasoning does not always hold. In Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College,'7 7 the petitioner had suffered a ruptured ulcer, yet refused as a Jehovah's Witness
to accept blood transfusions. Judge Skelly Wright signed the emergency
writ ordering the transfusion, as requested by the hospital. 17 While
Judge Wright in part justified his signing of the writ because of doubts he
had concerning the patient's mental condition, 79 he noted as well that
"[i]f self-homicide is a crime, there is no exception to the law's command
for those who believe the crime to be divinely ordained."' 80 The language
chosen by Judge Wright minimized the patient's religious convictions'
82
in justifying his admittedly admirable desire to see her live.'
Patients who for religious reasons refuse to seek medical treatment
for their children and whose children subsequently die are not treated as
generously by the courts. An early case, People v. Pierson,I8 3 affirmed the
conviction of a parent who, in accordance with his membership in the
Christian Catholic Church of Chicago, had relied on prayer rather than
seeking medical assistance for his sixteen and a half month old daughter
who subsequently died of catarrhal pneumonia.' 8 4 Conviction required a
finding that the defendant knew his child was seriously ill, and that refus85
ing to call a physician constituted "unlawfully neglecting" his duty.1
175.
176.
177.

44 Misc.2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962).
Id. at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), aff'd en banc, 331 F.2d 1010 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S.

978.
178. 331 F.2d at 1007.
179. Id. at 1007-8.
180. Id. at 1009.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1010.
183. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
184. Id. at 203-4, 68 N.E. at 244.
185. Id. at 204, 68 N.E. at 244.
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While criminal negligence satisfied the intent requirement, the standard
by which such intent could be inferred concerning when the necessity
arose to call in a physician remained the objective one of the "ordinarily
prudent person."' 186 Yet might not the "necessary" moment for calling in
a physician reasonably differ for one who sincerely believes in divine
healing as opposed to one who does not?187
Such questions are not merely of historic interest. In Walker v. Superior Court'8 8 the reviewing court sustained the denial of a motion requesting a dismissal of charges stemming from the death of the four year
old daughter of a defendant who relied on Christian Science practitioners. The girl died of acute purlent meningitis. 189 Again, the crime's required intent was criminal negligence, and the court held that "[t]he
point at which parents may incur liability for substituting prayer treatment..., is clear-when the lack of medical attention places the child in
a situation endangering its person or health."' 19 As with Pierson,'9 1 the
determination of requisite intent hinges on a no-longer-avoidable consequence: endangerment to the child. In effect, criminal negligence operates here as does strict liability. Undoubtedly the state's interest in
protecting the welfare of children is compelling. So too undoubtedly is a
charge of involuntary manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide, a
defacto recognition of the protection accorded parental discretion; otherwise, it is difficult to see why greater charges were not brought. Whether
an accommodation is made at sentencing for those who sincerely rely on
92
religious belief in such circumstances is not clear.
B.

Psychedelic Drugs and Religious Belief

Psychedelic drugs, religion, and criminal law have frdquently
formed the subject of criminal prosecution as well as of legal commen186. Id. at 206, 68 N.E. at 244.
187. See generally infra section IV. While New York does recognize a defense based on religious
belief in its endangering the welfare of a child statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1980),
it requires the parent or guardian to be "a member or adherent of an organized church or religious
group the tenets of which prescribe prayer as the principal treatment for illness." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 260.15(b) (McKinney 1980). Not only must prayer be the "principle" treatment prescribed, but
the religious belief cannot be an individual belief.
188. 176 Cal.3d 526, 222 Cal. Rptr. 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
189. Id.at 88.
190. Id. at 96.
191. See supra note 183.
192. For examples of related family-situation dilemmas, see State v. Sprague, 25 Or.App. 621,
550 P.2d 769 (Or. App. 1976) (criminal non-support prosecution); Shapiro v. Dorin, 199 Misc. 643,
99 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950) (prosecution for violation of compulsory education law).
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tary. 193 Intent rarely plays a part concerning the criminal law requirement, as simple possession of the drug alone is sufficient for conviction.
However, the constitutional defense of freedom of religious expression
requires examination of the purpose for which possession of the drug is
intended, and thus the mental state of the defendant as well as the sincerity of his religious belief come under question. The state's compelling
194
interest in protecting its citizens from danger is not compromised.
Similarly, there is relatively uniform treatment of questions involving intent and sincerity in relation to religious belief through examination of
quasi-objective criteria, most notably how essential the religious practice
involving psychedelic drugs is to the core elements of the religion itself.
More than in the other areas under consideration, analysis of alleged religious use of drugs relies on examining group behavior and its validity in
the eyes of the law.
Cases involving the religious use of peyote have served as vehicles
for much of the development of this area of the law. In State v. Big
Sheep,195 a member of the Native American Church was convicted of
possession of peyote. The defendant raised the first amendment defense,
substantiated by Native American Church biblical passages, 196 that peyote was required for religious purposes. Though the case was remanded
to determine the jurisdictional question of a Native American's citizenship,' 97 the court did address the proffered defense, finding it insufficient.
In particular, the court found that "if carried to the length defendant
insists upon, the use of opium, cocaine, and even 'moonshine' might be
justified under the guise of religious observance."' 98 In addition to once
again relying on the resulting-chaos argument,' 99 the court acknowledged no distinction between fraudulent claims and those sincerely based
on religious beliefs.
Nearly forty years later a court did address such distinctions. People
193. See generally Annotation, Free Exercise of Religion as Defense.to Prosecutionfor Narcotic
or Psychedelic Drug Offense, 35 A.L.R.3d 939 (1971).
194. As with psychedelic drugs, the courts have had little difficulty in determining the state has
a compelling interest in controlling how dangerous snakes are handled. See, e.g., Harden v. State,
188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1949); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972

(1942).
195. 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926).
196. Id. at 226, 243 P. at 1068 ("[t]hey ground their faith upon the Fourteenth Chapter of
Romans, the Fifty-third Chapter of Isaiah, second verse, and the Second Chapter of Revelations,
seventeenth verse, King James' Version.").
197. Id. at 238, 243 P. at 1072.
198. Id. at 239, 243 P. at 1073.
199. See supra notes 36, 39 and 172 and accompanying text.
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v. Woody2 held that the defendants, also members of the Native American Church, "used the peyote in a bona fide pursuit of a religious faith,
and since the practice does not frustrate a compelling interest of the
of
state, the application of the statute improperly defeated the immunity
' 20 1
States.
United
the
of
Constitution
the
of
Amendment
the First
The Woody court noted that only the defendant's constitutional objection could warrant reversal of conviction for mere possession.20 2 In
effect, the free exercise of religion defense, though designed to limit governmental control of religious belief, functions here to require consideration of intent: the intent, by implication, must be criminally and not
religiously motivated. Further, the Woody court determined that Peyotism 20 3 was central to the religious belief, and that the religious belief itself was of long standing. It recognized that "to forbid the use of peyote
is to remove the theological heart of Peyotism. ' ' 2°4 In regard to claims of
compelling state interest, "the state produced no evidence that spurious
claims of religious immunity would in fact preclude effective administration of the law, ' ' 20 5 thus answering the Big Sheep court's fear concerning,
among other things, the fraudulent assertion of the religious use of
moonshine.20 6 Of greatest interest here is the court's commentary on determining sincerity of belief. Citing Ballard, the court stated:
[T]he courts of necessity must ask whether the claimant holds his belief
honestly and in good faith or whether he seeks to wear the mantle of religious immunity merely as a cloak for illegal activities.
In so doing, we impose no undue burden upon the trier of fact. We do
not doubt the capacity of judge and jury to distinguish between those who
faith in an esoteric religion and those who would honestly folwould 20
-feign
7
low it.

200. 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
201. Id. at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
202. Id.
203. The court stated that Peyotism "combines certain Christian teachings with the belief that
peyote embodies the Holy Spirit and that those who partake of peyote enter into direct contact with
God." Id. at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
204. Id. at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74. The Woody court distinguished Reynolds, supra note 29, as
follows: "Polygamy, although a basic tenet in the theology of Mormonism, is not essential to the
practice of the religion; peyote, on the other hand, is the sine qua non of defendants' faith," Id. at
820, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
205. Id. at 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
206. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
207. Woody, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77. See also In re Grady, 394 P.2d 728 (1964)
(Habeus corpus petition granted for defendant convicted for unlawful possession of narcotics where
question as to whether his religious belief required his use of the drugs was a bona fide one and
remained unanswered).
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Separating the sincere from the feigned is one of the principle functions of fact finders. Unfortunately, the results are still mixed. One
Peyotist in North Carolina learned that "[e]ven if he were sincere, the
first amendment could not protect him."20 8 After citing Reynolds, the
court concluded that "[t]he defendant may believe what he will as to

peyote.... But it is not a violation of his constitutional rights to forbid
him, in the guise of his religion, to possess a drug.... "209 How the court
determined the defendant's religious belief constituted a "guise," with its
suggestion of deceit,2 10 remained unexplained-the very explanation necessary for determining sincerity of religious belief. Fortunately, other

courts have made explicit their reasoning for denying such claims. 2"
C. Fraud and Religious Belief
United States v. Ballard,2" 2 discussed earlier, has established the
constitutional perimeter for the analysis of cases involving alleged religious fraud. The truth or falsity of the belief cannot be judically examined, though the sincerity with which that belief may be held is open
to review. Many of the cases relying on the Ballard guidelines have involved mail fraud, where the defendant is accused of knowingly de-

frauding his correspondents. 1 3

In United States v. Rasheed,21 4 the Ninth Circuit affirmed convictions for mail fraud. Hakeem Abdul Rasheed (a.k.a. Clifford Jones)"'
208. State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 603, 148 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917
(1967) (court considered possession of peyote aid marijuana as well within the legitimate reach of
state's police power).
209. Id. at 604, 148 S.E.2d at 569.
210. Id. at 603, 148 S.E.2d at 568.
211. See, eg., Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967) (sincerity of belief not in
issue, but private use clearly distinguishable from religious ceremony in Native American Church);
United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968J (where church motto is "victory over horseshit" and the church key is a bottle opener, among other points, the court has little trouble in
declining to perceive Neo-American Church as a bona fide religious organization); People v. Crawford, 69 Misc.2d 500, 328 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1972), aff'd, 340 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1974) (no evidence drugs
used for religious ceremony, use of drugs intrinsic part of church dogma, or that defendant's own
religious beliefs would be inhibited absent drugs); State v. Soto, 537 P.2d 142 (Or. App. 1975) (compelling state interest in recognizing peyote and mescaline as dangerous drugs sufficient to convict the
defendant for possession). The Soto court declined to even recognize the defendant's right to put on a
religious use defense).
212. See Ballard, 322 U.S. 78.
213. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the "specific
intent to defraud is an element of the crime of mail fraud").
214. Id.
215. Id. at 843.
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had founded the Church of Hakeem in 1977.216 A premise of the faith
was the "law of increase, or law of cosmic abundance, which provided
that if one gave freely one would receive returns greater than the initial
gift."2'17 Rasheed's "Dare to be Rich" program promised a four-fold increase in money for each monetary gift received.2 18 Initially Rasheed told
his believers that the "increases" were coming from church invest'220
ments, 1 9 including "foreign investments in gold, diamonds, and oil."
The trouble was that the "increases" came exclusively from donations
made by other members. 221 No investments existed. Such a pyramid or
Ponzi scheme222 formed the substance of the charges involved.
The government conceded that the church was a religious organization.223 The case hinged on the representations made to members concerning the investments. Since the jury concluded that Rasheed lacked
sincere religious belief in the "Dare to be Rich" program's source of income,2 24 only the sufficiency of the evidence was before the Court. The
evidence concerning Rasheed's knowledge that no investments existed,
that all increases were paid from other members' contributions, and that
Rasheed had cultivated the false assumptions about investments were
held sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 225 How a court would handle
similar facts absent the misrepresentation of a material fact (here, investments) is, however, unclear.
D. CriminalAnarchy
Only one case, State v Cade,22 6 fits into this category based on religious activity. It stands as a sobering reminder that religious persecution
can and does still occur. Troy Bland Cade was the leader of a sect "composed of negroes, who style themselves Muslims. ' 22 7 He was convicted
216. Id. at 845.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 848.
221. Id. at 846.
222. Id. at 847 and 849, n. 1 (defining Ponzi scheme as a swindle in which promises of large
returns of investments are honored until the swindler has convinced enough people to "invest" at
which point initial "investments" are usually found to have been paid with funds taken from other

"investors").
223. Id. at 847.
224. Id. at 848.
225. Id.
226. 244 La. 534, 153 So.2d 382 (1963).
227. Id. at 538, 153 So.2d at 383.
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under Louisiana's criminal anarchy statute and sentenced to six years in
the Louisiana State Penitentiary.2 28 The statute made it a crime to organize or to become a member of a group "which is known to the offender to
advocate, teach, or practice the subversion, opposition, or destruction of
'
the government ... by violence or other unlawful means," 229
or to en-

gage in such practices. As the Supreme Court of Louisiana noted in reversing Cade's conviction, "[t]he litmus test of the crime charged is
whether violence, terrorism, or other unlawful methods have been
advocated."2 °
The principal evidence at trial and on review concerning the charge
of criminal anarchy was a blackboard "taken from the Muslim
Temple":2 3 1
The blackboard, to which reference has been made, was displayed in the
Muslim Temple. As one faces the board, a flag of the United States appears
on the left side. Underneath the flag is the inscription "Christianity," and a
cross. Immediately under the cross are the words, "Slavery Hell Death."
To the right of these words is a tree from which a black person is suspended
by a rope over a fire. On the right of the board is depicted the flag of Islam.
Under it is the inscription, "Freedom Justice Equality." In the center of the
232
board is the question: "Which one will survive the war of Armageddon?,
The opinion included testimony from the trial record concerning what
the blackboard as well as the religion advocated,2 33 and concluded that
"no discriminatory inference can be drawn from the board. '234 Further,
the court found no evidence in the record that violence or other unlawful
means were being advocated to overthrow the government. However, the
court remanded for a new trial because of the possibility that other evidence might be produced.23 5
How a lower court could have convicted on the evidence presented
becomes clear when the dissent of Justice Summers is reviewed.2 36 One
paragraph of the dissent, the only one which addresses the evidence of
criminal anarchy, is offered in full in order to illuminate the nature of the
reasoning involved:
If the symbolism of the board is subject to the interpretation that what is
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id., 153 So.2d at 383-84.
Id., 153 So.2d at 384. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 115 (West 1986).
Code, 244 Ga. at 546, 153 So.2d at 386-7.
Id., 153 So.2d at 387. A copy of the blackboard appears in the opinion.
Id. at 550, 153 So.2d at 388.
Id. at 550-56, 153 So.2d at 388-90.
Id. at 557, 153 So.2d at 391.
Id. at 559, 153 So.2d at 391.
Id. at 564, 153 So.2d at 393.
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taught thereby is "opposition" to the government by "unlawful means,"
then that board constitutes "some" evidence and this court cannot adjudge
the sufficiency thereof. It is my opinion that it is subject to the interpretation that opposition to the government by unlawful means is a tenet of the
Muslim group. Otherwise, why is the question asked: Will the United States
(represented by the United States flag) or Islam (represented by the other
flag) survive the final conflict between these two ideals-the war of Armageddon (an unlawful means)? There seems to be no doubt that the designers
of the board sought to instill into those who viewed the board a desire for
"Islam" to survive; for beneath that flag are listed "Freedom Justice Equality," whereas beneath the United States flag are listed "Slavery Hell Death,
etc." The inference to be gained is that the government represented by the
United States flag should not survive, that is, it should be destroyed and a
final conflict (War of Armageddon) will be the means of accomplishing that
end.2 37
V.

A METHOD OF ANALYSIS FOR CASES INVOLVING RELIGION,
INTENT, AND CRIMINAL LAW

In suggesting alternative methods of analysis applicable to cases of
the type this Comment has analyzed, it is necessary to keep in mind the
multi-step analysis required of any appellate court reviewing cases concerning defendants who have based their actions on sincerely held religious belief and whose actions conflict with governmental interests. The
religious nature of the conduct requires constitutional determination of
whether the belief itself will be recognized under the scope of the free
exercise clause. If not, the issue is dead. But if so, the appropriate balancing of interests must proceed. Yet this analysis alone is not sufficient.
While such examination covers the broad constitutional issue involved, it
does not address those cases in which the criminal law requires a finding
of intent. The question of the effect of potentially biased analysis, in
237. Id. at 567-68, 153 So.2d at 394. The quotation represents the only example of judicial
analysis finding a biblical reference, Revelations 16:16, sufficient evidence to warrant criminal conviction and six years imprisonment. As an isolated instance ofjudicial absurdity the quotation from the
dissent has mere curiosity value, but as an example of the possible, extraordinary flaws in thinking
when religious beliefs are being scrutinized by courts, the quotation should stand as a reminder of
the need to examine carefully decisions reached when religious belief, however unconventional, is
subject to the potentially equally unconventional illogic and beliefs of others.
Another catgory including only one case-homicide-is Strong itself. See supra note 1. The question of intent in Strong, as mentioned earlier, see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text, was not
whether the jury could have conceivably found the defendant unaware of the danger he exposed his
follower to by placing knives and a hatchet in him, but rather whether the court could conceive of
such a possibility as being present in the record. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. Cases
concerning homicide, religion, and insanity present different questions, and will be considered in the
the next section. See infra note 241.
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terms of either free exercise claims or intent requirements, on defendants
whose religious views differ radically from those of the trier of fact, often
goes ignored. If this is true, then the obfuscation in analysis is doubly
unfortunate, for here determination of intent, so obviously important to
the individual defendant, also implicitly tests the vitality of the free exercise clause in our society.
Religiously inspired conduct called to account through criminal
prosecution must receive the fairest possible review. Moreover, society
has an interest in preserving meaningful religious rights while maintaining peace and order through principled judicial determinations. For these
reasons, a way must be found to expose biased assumptions implicit in
determinations of intent for conduct predicated upon religion or religious
belief. By calling into question the defendant's mental state through existing affirmative defenses, or perhaps through recognizing the new application of current ones, defense counsel may be able to focus attention on
such underlying biases by requiring the trier of fact to directly address
the interrelationship of findings of intent with the constitutional dimension of religiously based conduct.
If a defense based on the defendant's mental state does not lead to
exculpation, or does so at too high a price to the defendant, another defense may still be found for mitigation of sentence. At the least the inclusion in the trial record of more extensive review of the defendant's state
of mind would permit more uniform, principled analysis by reviewing
courts. For instance, upon review it would allow an intelligent determination of whether the inclusion of a jury charge concerning lesser included offenses was warranted, or if intent has been wrongly inferred
through reliance on unconstitutional assumptions as to what constitutes
a religion or a sincerely held religious belief.
A.

Questions of Competency and Insanity

Questions of competency and insanity cast doubt on the mental state
of the defendant, and in the broadest sense have application to cases
where intent requirements must be met and the conduct involved is arguably within the ambit of the free exercise clause. Conviction of a legally incompetent accused violates due process.23 8 If neither the state nor
the defendant raise the issue of competence, and if there exists evidence
that " 'raises a bonafide doubt' as to a defendant's competence to stand
238. See Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956) (judgment vacated, case remanded for
hearing on sanity of defendant at time of trial).

734
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trial, the judge on his own motion ' 3 9 must raise the issue. 40 Similarly,
an insane defendant does not stand legally responsible for his actions regardless of whether the content of his delusions includes religious
manifestations.
Neither competency questions nor doubts as to sanity are satisfactory legal strategies for defendants whose religiously inspired conduct violates the law. While religious delusions have long been recognized by
the courts as exculpatory, 4 1 true religious devotees are hardly likely to
seek to have their beliefs, whether they be faith healing, polygamy, or
some other, characterized as delusional. Hence, questions of competence
or sanity are not likely to be raised by defendants who sincerely believe
that their religion demands the conduct for which the state seeks to punish them. On a more pragmatic level, in all but the direst cases, commitment by way of mental infirmity would be a more extreme result and
more damaging to the defendant than a brief prison sentence.2 42 The
greatest problem associated with raising issues of competency to stand
trial or insanity is that in doing so the religiously inspired nature of the
conduct is negated. Too great a willingness by triers of fact or appellate
judges to perceive defendants who claim religious reasons for their actions as delusional runs the risk of endangering the very protections offerred by the free exercise clause.
239. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).
240. Given that the judge can raise issues of competency or sanity on his or her own motion, id.,
as can the state, id., the defendant may not have the option to reject the strategy. How successful
defendants might be in challenging on free exercise grounds doubts as to their competency or sanity
is beyond the scope of this Comment. So too are conflicts between counsel and client-defendant as to
choice of defense strategy. One question that could be asked is how should counsel proceed if he
considers questionable his client's competency because for religious reasons the defendant refuses to
use certain defenses. Would not counsel's decision embroil him in the very constitutional questions
raised in this Comment?
241. Delusional thinking with religious content has long been recognized by the courts. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 42 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 503 (1844):
A common instance [of delusional thinking] is where [the defendant] fully believes that
the act he is doing is done by the immediate command of God, and he acts under the
delusive but sincere belief that what he is doing is by the command of a superior power,
which supersedes all human laws, and the laws of nature.
See also Guiteau's Case, 10 F. 161 (D.D.C. 1881) (trial of assassin of President Garfield), People v.
Moore, 123 Misc.2d 291, 473 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Co. Ct. 1984) (defendant, claiming himself Jesus, cut
the head off a woman he never met, claiming she was the devil). Cf People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y.
324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915) (Cardozo, J.) (defendant who now admits, after conviction for murder,
that he feigned insanity, claiming God had commanded he murder and dismember woman, cannot,
as a result of that admission, assert he has been denied due process of law for that reason).
242. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
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ExtratemporalConsequences

Only one commentator, Jesse H. Choper,24 3 has approached suggesting defenses for defendants whose religiously inspired conduct has
generated government censorship through criminal prosecution. By "extratemporal consequences" Choper means "whether the effects of actions
taken pursuant or contrary to the dictates of a person's beliefs extend in
some meaningful way beyond his lifetime." 2' As Choper states it:
[A]Ithough there is no sure method of proving it scientifically as an empirical matter, intuition and experience affirm that the degree of internal
trauma on earth for those who have put their souls in jeopardy for eternity
can be expected to be markedly greater than for those who have only violated a moral scruple .... [B]ecause the burden of obeying the law is so
severe for the religious objector, our traditions hold that his noncompliance
is not as morally culpable as one who disobeys on other reasons. This principle is reflected in the defenses of duress and necessity in the criminal law,
excusing or justifying violations when the cost of compliance is higher than
an individual can reasonably be expected to bear.24 5
The defense of necessity24 6 is particularly inviting in that it recognizes a
balancing between the harm committed and the harm avoided. Should
the harm avoided outweigh the harm committed, justification exists. 247
The trouble with applying such a defense to the sort of cases of concern
here is three-fold. First, although such a defense would require courts to
examine defendants' intent more closely in determining the harm
avoided than presently required, there still exists-as Choper recognized
-"the danger of parochialism and intolerance-that judges will include.
conventional orthodoxy in the definition and exclude new, unfamiliar, or
'dangerous' beliefs." 24 8 The nineteenth century Mormon polygamy cases,
243. See supra note 49.
244. Choper, supra note 49, at 599.
245. Id. at 598.
246. THE MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 153, § 3.02, has articulated a justification/choice of
evils defense, which states:
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or

to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to
be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses
dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly
appear.
However, § 3.02(2) of the Code specifically rules out crimes where the degree of culpability required for conviction does not exceed recklessness.
247. Id. at § 3.02(l)(a).
248. Choper, supra note 49, at 599.
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Reynolds and Davis, were cited as examples.24 9 Second, the defense

presuposes belief in extratemporal consequences, which may or may not
prove part of the religious belief held by the defendant. Third, and most
important, to the extent the defense seeks exculpation it conflicts with the

resulting chaos argument 25 ° so consistently used by courts to rebut efforts to justify actions based upon religious belief. Indeed, any defense

seeking to totally free the defendant from his responsibility for his religiously based conduct rightfully runs up against society's compelling in-

terest in being free from the danger inherent in so radical a solution.
Rather than seeking exculpation, the answer may lie in seeking grounds
for mitigation.
C. ExtraordinaryReligious Reliance
What method of analysis will lend itself by analogy to permit courts

to conduct principled consideration for sentencing of defendants whose
alleged criminal conduct, inspired by sincerely held religious belief, has

required determination of intent? Such a method should, ideally, recognize the state's compelling interest in prohibiting such conduct while also
permitting a court to acknowledge, if it finds appropriate, the influence of
the defendant's sincerely held religious belief upon his actions.
One method of analysis that lends itself by analogy to such situa-

tions is the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, available to mitigate murder in the second degree to manslaughter in the first

degree.25t Extreme emotional disturbance requires no finding of insanity, 252 thereby avoiding the stigma incurred by that defense. 25 3 Nor is
249. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145; see supra note 29 and accompanying text (for discussion of Reynolds); Davis, 133 U.S. 333; see supra note 42 and accompanying text (for discussion of Davis).
250. See supra note 38.
251. THE MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 153, § 210.3, articulates the defense of extreme
emotional disurbance, which states:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall [sic] be determined from
the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be.

The AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE commentary

noted that the standard "places far more emphasis

than does the common law on the actor's subjective mental state." Id. at 54. However, "itis equally
plain that idiosyncratic moral values are not part of the actor's situation." Id. at 62.
New York's standard is essentially identical. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(l)(a) (McKinney
1975).
252. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 302, 347 N.E.2d 898, 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 582
(1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 197 (1976) ("The influence of an extreme emotional disturbance explains the
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the defense limited to heat of passion requirements. 254 Yet the defense of
extreme emotional disturbance "is consistent with modem criminological
thought to reduce the defendant's criminal liability upon proof of mitigating circumstances which render his conduct less blameworthy."25
The defense requires the defendant 25 6 to establish two elements. First,

the defendant must prove by a "preponderance of the credible evi-

dence" 2 7 that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.2 58 Second, once the disturbance is established, the defendant must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the disturbance had reasonable explanation or excuse. 259 The essential point here is that "reasonableness" must, at least in part,26 "be determined from the viewpoint of
a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the de-

fendant believed them to be." 26 Thus, the subjective standard for reasonableness focuses the analysis on the defendant's particular behavior seen
from his or her own perspective.
One way to apply the above analytic framework to cases where

mental state involves religious belief is through the construction of an
affirmative defense of extraordinary religious reliance.2 62 This defense
would allow a court to conclude that, if it found defendant's conduct to

be the result of a sincerely held religious belief, and if that conduct was
the result of such extraordinary religious reliance reasonably explainable
from the "viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the
defendant's intentional action, but does not make the action any less intentional. The purpose of the
extreme emotional disturbance defense is to permit the defendant to show that his actions were
caused by a mental infirmity not arising to the level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for
having committed them.").
253. However, at least one court, the New York Supreme Court, in Pe6ple v. Shelton, 88 Misc.
2d 136, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 434 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1980), has recognized that
extreme emotional disturbance has its parallel with DSM III, supra note 150.
254. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d at 303, 347 N.E.2d at 908, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
255. Id.
256. The Patterson court held that this burden on the defendant did not violate due process
rights. New York requires the prosecution to'prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt; defendant's
burden extends only to the affirmative defense itself. The defense does not negate intent.
257. Shelton, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
258. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(l)(a).
259. Id.
260. New York has determined that the defense is in part objective, at least to the extent discretion on the judge's part can permit denial of mitigation. See People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 404
N.E.2d 1310, 427 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1980).
261. N.Y. PENAL LAW, supra note 258.
262. The term is designed to parallel New York's term of extreme emotional disturbance, as
well as the MODEL PENAL CODE'S.
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circumstances as the defendant believed them to be,"' 263 a subjective standard, mitigation of sentence would be appropriate to consider regardless
of the offense charged. 2"
Presenting such an affirmative defense would establish in the record
additional testimony focused precisely on the element so often neglected
in such cases: intent. It would, under appropriate circumstances, emphasize the respect our legal system ideally accords individual dignity. 265 It
would more clearly direct the fact-finder's attention to the option of convicting under a lesser included offense. Finally, it would reinforce,
through its attention to the religious motives of the defendant, both the
state's interest in the correctness of criminal decisions and its interest in
preserving the respect due questions pertaining to the fundamental constitutional protection of religious belief.
At least two objections to construction of an affirmative defense of
extraordinary religious reliance should be addressed. The first could be
characterized as follows: if at least one of the purposes of mitigation of
sentencing is to recognize that under some circumstances a defendant
legally guilty of a crime is unlikely to repeat the conduct under question,
would not the religiously-inspired defendant, insofar as his mental state
has been fostered by sincerely held religious belief, be all the more likely
to repeat such actions? In answer, it can be argued that the effect of such
a defense is limited by its discretionary nature. How applicable the defense would be rests, in part, on the very likelihood of the prohibited
conduct being repeated. Special circumstances where the risk of repetition is low may well fall within the principled acceptance of such a defense by a judge considering mitigation of sentence.2 6 6 Other factors
bearing on determining the likelihood of repeated conduct could include
267
the degree to which the prohibited conduct was inspired by core values
263. See supra note 261.
264. As has been discussed earlier, see supra note 26 and accompanying text, to invoke extraordinary religious reliance as an exculpatory defense might be theoretically possible, but it is
hardly likely that judges would permit acts such as Strong's placing of knives into another to go

without punishment. As a practical matter the application of the defense.in a more limited manner
would more likely meet with some success. So, too, this Comment urges consideration of the defense

for all possible charges, not just to mitigate murder in the second degree to manslaughter in the first
degree.
265. See Dalgado,Ascription of CriminalStates of Mind: Toward a Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded("Brainwashed") Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REv. 1, 7 n. 30 (1978) ("The decision to
recognize a given defense, like the decision to criminalize certain forms of behavior, is ultimately a
moral one, reflecting notions of acceptable conduct under current social standards.").
266. See supra note 192.
267. "Core values" were used to a great extent in order to establish the Amish's right to remove
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of the faith and the extent to which defendants would suffer extratemporal consequences2 6 dictated by the religious belief should the
conduct not be repeated. The more abstention from the conduct implicates core values, or threatens extreme extratemporal consequences, the
greater the likelihood of repetition and the less the justification for exercising discretion under the defense of extraordinary religious reliance.
A second objection to a defense of extraordinary religious reliance
involves a more fundamental problem: assuming courts were to recognize
such a defense would not the decision maker be just as biased against
conduct inspired by religious beliefs radically different from his own?
Would not such biases play just as strongly, and just as covertly, in sentencing as in determining guilt? Perhaps so. Yet presenting such a defense would serve at least three purposes. First, it would require the
decision-maker to, in part, address events from the subjective view of the
defendant, thus buttressing focus on the sincerity with which the belief is
held. Second, the presentation of the defense would itself preserve for the
record substantial evidence concerning intent, thus making it clearly
available for purposes of appeal. Third, addressing the conduct from the
defendant's subjective view could itself be an education in religious tolerance for the decision-maker, not to convince the decision-maker of the
truth or falsity of the religious belief, but in order to permit the decisionmaker a principled way to temper a justice that would otherwise be rigidly imposed. All three purposes, if realized, would help minimize the
chance that a defendant charged with criminal conduct would be convicted or find his conviction affirmed on the basis of unconstitutional
analysis concerning his religion or religious belief.
Constitutional doctrine rightly forbids examination of the truth or
falsity of religious belief. Yet forbidding overt determination does nothing to check covert judgment. A defense of extraordinary religious reliance, insofar as it directs focus precisely on the defendant's subjective
state, would act as a counterbalance to rampant religious intolerance.
Decisions based on such intolerance remain no less unconstitutional because covertly reached.
VI.

THE MODEL APPLIED

In reversing Robert Strong's conviction for manslaughter in the second degree, Judge Jasen of the New York Court of Appeals wrote that
their children from school after eighth grade. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; see supra note 82 (for discussion
of Yoder).
268. See supra notes 24347 and accompanying text.
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"there is a reasonable basis upon which the jury could have found that
the defendant failed to perceive the risk inherent in his actions. ' '2 69 That
reasonable basis included examination of the sincerity of the beliefs held
as well as objective indications of the defendant's claimed subjective
state.270 While holding, in part, that, based upon the defendant's belief,
the lesser included offense was appropriate, it is revealing that Judge
Jasen did not once27 mention the religious nature of the belief. Not doing
so undoubtedly avoided extended discussion concerning religion and religious belief and the constitutional dimension inherent in such questions,
but it also offered no check to analysis such as that appearing in Judge
Gabrielli's dissent:
This case might profitably be analogized to one where an individual believ-

ing himself to be possessed of extraordinary skill as an archer attempts to
duplicate William Tell's feat and split ari apple on the head of another indi-

vidual from some distance. However, assume that rather than hitting the

apple, the archer kills the victim. Certainly, his obtuse subjective belief in
his extraordinary skill would not render his2 72actions criminally negligent .... The present case is indistinguishable.
It seems clear that the present case is distinguishable from the William
Tell analogy, and the "obtuse subjective belief" is actually a religious
belief. Without explicitly recognizing the religious nature of the belief,
however unorthodox, the conclusion that the belief represents obtuse
subjectivity arguably rests implicitly on a covert determination that the
belief is false. In other words, stripped of its religious significance, the
belief that no harm will come to those who receive knife wounds four or
more inches deep to the chest 273 is clearly the product of either delusional thinking 6r unabashed dissimulation. Seen as the product of sincerely held religious belief, however, there indeed exists the possibility
the defendant was unaware of the risk associated with acting on his religious belief. In Strong, the former characterization leads to a finding of
either madness or recklessness, the latter, to a finding of criminally negligent homicide.
Strong illustrates how a finding of specific intent in criminal cases
dealing with conduct based on siicerely held religious belief unavoidably
involves the fact-finder' in determinations of mental state inseparable
from constitutional questions. Strong further suggests that covert conclu269. People v. Strong, 37 N.Y.2d 568, 571, 338 N.E.2d 602, 604, 376 N.Y.S.2d 87, 89 (1975).
270. Id. at 571-72, 338 N.E.2d at 604, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
271. Id. at 571-72, 338 N.E.2d at 604, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90.
272. Id. at 574, 338 N.E.2d at 606, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
273. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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sions as to the truth or falsity of the religious belief, an unconstitutional
basis for such decisions, have serious consequences for defendants whose
religious beliefs appear unorthodox or alien to the trier of fact.
The value of a defense of extraordinary religious reliance rests on its
ability to present to the trier of fact justification for concluding, as could
have been the case in Strong, that a lesser included offense conviction is
warranted. By concentrating on the subjective validity of the defendant's
belief, the trier of fact would be spared the possible dilemma of squaring
a finding of reasonableness of the conduct with his own conviction as to
what objectively constitutes a religious belief. Removing this dilemma by
insisting on a subjective standard of reasonableness through application
of the defense of extraordinary religious reliance is one step toward assuring that the punishment involved is less likely to be the product of
covert bias and more likely to be the product of principled reasoning.
Covert (as well as not so covert) bias as to what constitutes religious
belief in the eyes of the decision-maker has been seen before. It accounts
in part for jury instructions that label the beliefs upon which conduct is
founded as the product of "delusional thinking" affecting "victims" ' 2 7 4 as
well as for interpreting a biblical reference to Armegeddon as evidence of
criminal anarchy warranting years of imprisonment. 2 " It appears reasonable to believe that jurors are no less susceptible to such bias than are
judges at both trial and appellate levels, and are undoubtedly less held to
account for it. A defense of extraordinary religious reliance, as presented
here, would preserve for the record and for review the possibility of such
bias having unconstitutionally influenced the decision process.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Strong, as well as the other cases analyzed in this Comment, suggests the need for acute awareness of constitutional concerns when questions involving findings of specific intent in criminal cases concern
conduct inspired by allegedly sincerely held religious beliefs. This Comment has sought to show that in such cases questions of intent may easily
embroil the trier of fact, and later reviewing courts, in issues of constitutional dimension. The opportunity to base decisions on covertly held assumptions as to what constitutes religious belief, or sincerely held
religious belief, carries with it the danger that the decision-maker's inability to accept unorthodox or seemingly bizarre beliefs will result in
274. Reynolds, 99 U.S. at 166-68; see supra notes 39-40.
275. Cade, 244 La. at 538-46, 153 So.2d 386-91; see supra note 226.
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determinations of intent predicated on such covert, yet unconstitutional,
reasoning.
In order to assure defendants the fairest possible results, and in order to assure society that such covert reasoning does not jeopardize free
exercise rights while recognizing society's legitimate interest in safety,
peace, and order, this Comment has suggested the construction of an
affirmative defense of extraordinary religious reliance modeled on the
reasoning and requirements found in the defense of extreme emotional
disturbance. The defense would permit presentation to the trier of fact,
for purposes of either mitigation of sentence or inclusion of a lesser included offense, evidence to be used to demonstrate that the defendant's
conduct was based on extraordinary religious reliance reasonably determinable from the defendant's point of view. Requiring the trier of fact to
examine the sincerity of the defendant's beliefs from a more subjective
stance for the purposes stated above would help preserve the dignity accorded an individual's religious beliefs without sacrificing society's interest in refusing to permit free reign to religiously based conduct.
JOHN

S. HILBERT

